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Abstract 
The Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom have a long, close and difficult 
history. The most recent phase of which dates from 1998 and the conclusion of 
the Good Friday Agreement. Since 1921, however, there has been unique practice 
between Ireland and the UK as regards the transfer of accused and convicted 
persons from one to the other. Indeed, there has been a special and close 
relationship between the two in that regard; albeit one not without difficulties. In 
recent times EU Justice and Home Affairs measures and the Good Friday 
Agreement have supplemented and strengthened the relationship. These include, 
since January 2004, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The EAW has been 
particularly important in streamlining the extradition process between the Ireland 
and the UK. This phase of history and co-operation is coming to an end. The UK's 
membership of the EU has now ceased, and a transition period during which the 
UK remains part of the EAW will end on 31st December 2020. The extradition 
relationship between the two is therefore facing a considerable challenge. There 
are several options open to Ireland, the UK and the EU as a replacement. Time, 
political will and the interests of third states, however, may well stand in the way 
of the conclusion of an agreement that optimally serves the interests of all parties 
and criminal justice. This paper considers the origins of extradition between the 
UK and Ireland and the alternative methods of extradition open to the UK and 
Ireland after Brexit. Consideration is given to the likely operation of a Norway-
Iceland style agreement and whether such an agreement will be in place by the 
end of the transition and, if it was, whether its terms are likely to be sufficient for 
the needs of Ireland and the UK. The possibility of a bilateral arrangement on 
extradition between Ireland and the UK is also explored. Underlying the discussion 
is the critical point that the future extradition relationship must retain its ‘special’ 
 
characteristics, and therefore maintain the trust and good will that has developed 
over the years and given rise to an effective extradition relationship between the 
two countries. In other words, the lessons of history must be remembered.   
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Introduction 
 
The United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union will inevitably change 
the Ireland – UK extradition relationship. As both countries were European Union 
members extradition between them was governed by the European Arrest Warrant 
Framework Decision. This was implemented in Ireland by the European Arrest 
 
Warrant Act 2003 and in the UK by the Extradition Act 2003. The UK’s departure 
from the EU will almost certainly have a negative impact on the ability of Ireland 
and the UK to secure accused and convicted persons from each other efficiently 
and effectively. This regrettable position will most likely subsist regardless of the 
model of extradition that is adopted to govern the process. It is regrettable simply 
because the process has been a vital criminal justice tool in the fight against crime, 
be it national or transnational. ‘Ireland’s largest “trading partner” for EAWs is 
Britain.’1 The importance of continued close co-operation is universally recognised. 
Ireland’s Department of Justice and Equality 2017 Annual Report on the operation 
of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 stated ‘[t]he departure of the UK is 
particularly significant for Ireland on a range of issues. However, in the context of 
combatting crime and terrorism, the necessity to maintain a functioning system 
of extradition between the two States has been identified as the key priority’.2 The 
shared land border and geographic proximity, the free movement of persons under 
the Common Travel Area and the history of politically-related violence between 
and within Great Britain and the island of Ireland all contribute to the priority. This 
paper considers the origins of extradition between the UK and Ireland and the 
alternative methods of extradition open to the UK and Ireland after Brexit. 
Consideration is given to the possible conclusion and terms of a Norway-Iceland 
style agreement and whether such an agreement might be sufficient for the needs 
of Ireland and the UK. The possibility of a bilateral arrangement on extradition 
between Ireland and the UK is also explored. Underlying the discussion is the 
critical point that the future extradition relationship must retain its ‘special’ 
characteristics, and therefore maintain the trust and good will that has developed 
over the years and given rise to an effective extradition relationship between the 
two. In other words, the lessons of history must be remembered.   
 
Part 1 - The Past, 1921 - 1998 
 
The Context of Ireland – UK extradition 
 
1 R. Briscoe, ‘Brextradition, (2017) Jan/Feb Law Society Gazette of Ireland’ 36.  
2 Department of Justice and Equality, Report on the operation of the European Arrest 
Warrant Act 2003 (as amended) for the year 2017, p 4, cited at 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/European_Arrest_Warrant_Annual_Report_for_2017.pdf/F
iles/European_Arrest_Warrant_Annual_Report_for_2017.pdf <accessed 29-08-20>.  
 
 
The context of Ireland-UK extradition it found in the common history between the 
nations. Indeed, the development of their extradition relationship is imperfectly 
shadowed by changes in the political position of both. In an extradition context 
the stages of that history are usefully given as 1800 – 1921, 1921 – 1965, 1965 
– 1998, and 1998 – 2020. Two features of Ireland and UK history transcend all 
these stages; the close and inter-twined political and personal relationships 
between the countries and their populations on the one hand, and the tensions, 
conflicts, violence and criminality that has sporadically come to the fore between 
them on the other. This fact has led to a close yet sporadically dysfunctional 
extradition relationship. Illustrating the closeness of the relationship is the fact 
that the backing of warrants had subsisted between Ireland and the UK for a 
considerable period. The procedure has been described as where: 
 
… the authorities of the jurisdiction where the person is wanted issue their 
normal warrant of arrest, which is sent directly to the authorities of the 
jurisdiction where he is, who endorse it if it appears to be in order, and 
give it to their policemen to execute as if it were their own. The suspect 
is then ‘lifted’, and handed over to the authorities of the country where 
he is wanted with the minimum of fuss – the unspoken premise being 
that the authorities of the requesting jurisdiction normally act lawfully 
and reasonably…3 
 
Exposing the basis of the tensions between Ireland and the UK, albeit obliquely, 
was Ó Dálaigh CJ in discussing the legal basis of the backing of warrants prior to 
1965, the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851. He said in State (Quinn) v Ryan that 
the Act purports: 
 
… to authorise removal from the jurisdiction instanter without any 
opportunity, reasonable or otherwise, to invoke the Courts. There can be 
little doubt that this was the purpose of the Act when it was enacted. 
Ireland was then part of the entity known as the United Kingdom of Great 
 
3 J. Spencer, ‘The European Arrest Warrant’ (2003-2004) 6 The Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 201.  
 
Britain and Ireland and was in enjoyment of the benefits of the Act of 
Union. One of these benefits was the free interchange of alleged offenders 
subject to the formality of local backing of warrants. However unreal, the 
theory was that an Irishman, as a subject of the Queen, should have been 
as happy, safe and as much at home in Britain as in Ireland.4 
 
In relatively modern times, the tensions have led to levels of violence and disorder 
which in turn affected criminal co-operation and extradition.5 Features of this 
included the introduction of a political offence exception into the process and the 
refusal of certain extradition requests under it. Indeed, the exception was not 
uncommonly applied during the height of the Troubles between 1972 and 1979 
where, as a US extradition case notes, political violence claimed 1770 lives, of 
which 1300 were civilians.6 Fortunately, recent decades have witnessed lessened 
tensions and increased co-operation. In law, this is seen through joint membership 
of the EU from 1 January 1973, both being party to the European Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorism 1977 and participation in the EAW as from 1 January 
2004.  
 
The Origins of the Process 1921-1965 
 
The history of extradition between Ireland and the UK in a formal sense is 
relatively short.7 As ‘extradition’ generally denotes rendition between sovereign 
states Irish-UK practice began in 1921 with the declaration of the Irish Free State. 
In large part reflecting the close and inter-twined relationship between the two 
jurisdictions the pre-1921 process of rendition subsisted for over four decades 
after the creation of the Irish Free State. The system was one of backing of 
 
4 Ibid at p 118-119. 
5 See, for example, T. Duffy, ‘The Law v. the IRA: The Effect of Extradition between the 
United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and the United States in Combatting the IRA’ 
(1991) 9(2) Penn State International Law Review 293. 
6 As noted in Matter of Doherty by Government of the United Kingdom (1984) 599 F. Supp 
270 at 273. 
7 The origins of the recognition of warrants in both Ireland and England is discussed in P. 
O’Higgins, ‘Irish Extradition Law and Practice’ (1958) 34 British Yearbook of International 
Law 274 at pp 275 - 284.  
 
warrants.8 Unlike standard extradition practice no prima facie evidence was 
required9, nor did a hearing in the requested territory take place. Governing these 
arrangements were generally the Indictable Offences Act 1848 and the Petty 
Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851. These rules were extended to the Irish Free State by 
provision in both jurisdictions.10 Any arrest warrant issued by a court in Britain or 
Ireland was immediately effective throughout those jurisdictions. The basis for 
this included section 29 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 which inter alia 
provided: 
 
Whenever any person against whom any warrant shall be issued by any 
justice or other such officer as aforesaid in England or Scotland … for any 
crime or offence, shall reside or be, or be suspected to reside or be, in 
any place in Ireland, it shall be lawful for the said inspector general… to 
indorse the same in like manner and upon like proof as aforesaid, 
authorizing the execution of the same within his jurisdiction.11 
 
The system of backing of warrants under the 19th century legislation existed until 
1965. It operated relatively effectively. O’Higgins notes that the existence of the 
systems of the reciprocal execution of warrants seems never to have been 
considered as possibly incompatible with the independent status of the Free State. 
This was perhaps because of the restraint exercised by the British authorities in 
sending warrants to Dublin at a time when such actions might well have been 
 
8 A description of the position is found in S. Baker, D. Perry, A. Doobay, ‘A Review of the 
United Kingdom’s Extradition Arrangements’ 2011, paras 3.43 – 3.48, the ‘Baker Review’, 
found at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/117673/extradition-review.pdf <accessed 30-08-20> 
9 The UK statute governing extradition with colonies and Dominions (apart from Ireland 
who left the Commonwealth in 1949), the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 contained a prima 
facie evidence requirement.  
10 Article 73 of the Irish Free State Constitution provided that the laws in force at the date 
of its entry into operation shall continue to be of full force. The British Order in Council, 
the Irish Free State (Consequential Adaptation of Enactments) Order 1923, provided that 
the provisions of any enactments applicable to the endorsement and execution in England 
of warrants issued by justices' courts or judges of courts in Ireland should apply to 
warrants issued by justices' courts or judges of courts in the Irish Free State.  
11 Cited at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1851/act/93/enacted/en/print.html 
<accessed 30-08-20> 
 
resented.12 The need for a streamlined system was enhanced by the establishment 
of the Common Travel Area (CTA) between the UK, the Crown Dependencies and 
Ireland. As to the scale of extradition, during the passage of the Backing of 
Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 the Solicitor General Sir Dingle Foot noted 
in the House of Commons that ‘the figure has run for a long time at about 100 
each way each year.’13 The continuation and relative success of the backing of 
warrants scheme after 1921 has been put down to ‘… the mutual desire of the 
British and Irish governments of the time to deal with Irish extremists and at the 
same time to protect the essential rights of those interned and deported…’.14 
Challenges to the system after 1921 in both Ireland15 and England16 were 
unsuccessful.  
 
The rendition practice between the Republic and Northern Ireland stands in 
contrast to that with Great Britain. This was in spite of the Free State’s Customs 
and Excise (Adaptation of Enactments) Order 192417 and the UK’s Irish Free State 
(Consequential Adaptation of Enactments) Order 192318 providing that warrants 
issued in each were to be executed in the other. Frustrating practice firstly was 
the 1928 Dublin High Court case of O’Boyle and Rodgers v Attorney General and 
Duffy.19 It held that since Northern Ireland did not exist when the 1851 Act came 
into effect there was no authority for the Irish Government to extend it there. In 
response to the judgment the Northern Ireland authorities similarly refused to 
execute Free State warrants. Accordingly, there were no practically applicable 
 
12 O’Higgins, supra note 7 at p 287. 
13 House of Commons Hansard, vol. 707, 24 Feb. 1965 at col 557, cited at 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1965-02-24/debates/fb821017-1aac-4358-
abf2-2a0c584bc2e5/BackingOfWarrants(RepublicOfIreland)BillLords <accessed 30-08-
20>. 
14 O’Higgins, supra note 7 at p 288. 
15 The State (Dowling) v Kingston (1937) 71 ILTR 223. 
16 R v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, ex p Nalder [1948] 1 KB 251. It would not 
be until 1965 that adverse judicial decisions in both jurisdictions were decided, mentioned 
presntly. 
17 ECO., No. 1 of 1924, Dublin Gazette, 21 March 1924, section 9. 
18 SR &O 1923, No 401, para 8(1). 
19 See B. Warner, ‘Extradition Law and Practice in the Crucible of Ulster, Ireland and Great 
Britain: A Metamorphosis?’ (1987) Conflict Quarterly 57 at note 4. The disapplication of 
the 1851 Act as regards Northern Ireland in the case has been termed ‘bad law’ on account 
of the 1924 Order, Warner, ibid at note 4. See also M. McGrath, ‘Extradition: Another Irish 
Problem’ (1983) 34(4) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 295. 
 
arrangements between the Republic and Northern Ireland from 1928 to 1965. 
Extradition within Ireland had ceased operation within a decade of the founding of 
the Irish Republic.20 Notably, however, informal co-operation between the police 
forces within Ireland took place whereby suspected criminals were taken into 
custody and ‘politely conducted to a convenient place on the Border and handed 
over to the corresponding authority.’21 This practice, after coming under scrutiny 
in a case at the Irish Supreme Court22 and in the House of Lords23, was part of the 
impetus within the Republic that led to the 1965 legislation that regularised Ireland 
– UK extradition practice. These cases, as well as the Irish desire to act in 
accordance with the relatively recently concluded European Convention on 
Extradition 1957, led to extradition relations between Ireland and the UK being 
put on a new legislative footing.  
 
Extradition Hindered 1965-1998 
 
From 1965 to 2004 extradition between Ireland and the UK was governed by, in 
Ireland, the Extradition Act 1965 (in particular in Part 3) and the UK, the Backing 
of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965.24 This fact is notable in that extradition 
between almost all countries is governed by treaty not domestic legislation alone. 
In 1965 Ireland and the UK continued to eschew that practice, the two Acts being 
drafted following consultation. As the name of the latter suggests, the essence of 
the arrangement did not change. The reciprocal acceptance of arrest warrants 
remained at the heart of the system. That said, real amendments were made. As 
 
20 Warner, ibid, at p 58. O’Higgins notes that there was one case between 1929 and 1947, 
that of White, who was arrested in Northern Ireland on a warrant issued in the Republic, 
O’Higgins, supra note 7 at note 4. 
21 O’Higgins, supra note 7 at p 294. 
22 In State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] 1 IR 70 the Irish Supreme Court held that the s 29 of 
the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851 was repugnant to the Constitution and invalid. Ó 
Dálaigh CJ stated that the “… claim made on behalf of the police to be entitled to arrest a 
citizen and forthwith to bundle him out of the jurisdiction before he has an opportunity of 
considering his rights is the negation of law and a denial of justice” 
23 In R v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Ex P. Hammond [1965] AC 810 the 
House of Lords held that the requirement that a warrant from Erie be endorsed by the 
Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary before being acted upon by the English 
Magistrate was impossible to satisfy since that office had been disbanded in 1922. 
Accordingly, Hammond was released. 
24 With the significance of the Good Friday Agreement the parameters of the present period 
of extradition practice dates from 1998.  
 
noted, Ireland’s desire to give effect to the Council of Europe’s European 
Convention on Extradition 1957 (ECE) conditioned the new law.25 B. Lenihan 
speaking in the Dail Eireann said the Extradition Act 1965 is ‘… based almost 
entirely on the terms of the European Convention on Extradition.’26 The UK, for its 
part, wanted to regularise relations after Hammond.27 In support of the Backing 
of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Bill Alice Bacon MP said in the House of Commons 
 
The two countries are close together, there are a great many cases and the 
laws of the two countries are very similar. Because it is quick, simple and 
cheap to get from the Republic to the United Kingdom, particularly across 
the border into Northern  Ireland, there are as many as 100 offenders who 
have to be returned to the Republic each year.28  
 
The two 1965 Acts retained a system whereby a warrant issued by a judicial 
authority in the requesting state was passed to a judicial authority in the requested 
state for endorsement and execution. As before, the establishment of a prima 
facie case was not required.29 This is in line with the ECE. As O’Higgins notes, it 
would have been absurd if Ireland required prima facie evidence from the UK and 
not from its fellow parties to the ECE.30 The principle of speciality is also absent in 
the legislation, and there is no exception of nationals from the process. 
 
25 Notably article 28(3) of the ECE permits parties to it to carry on extradition in a manner 
not in accordance with its terms where surrender takes place between them on the basis 
of the lawful execution of warrants. O’Higgins notes that this provision was inserted to 
permit the special form of extradition between Ireland and the UK if both became party to 
it, supra note 8. As it turned out, Ireland ratified the treaty in May 1966 whereas the UK 
did not do so until February 1991. 
26 Dail Eireann, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 215, cols. 1879, 1880, as cited in O’Higgins, 
supra note 7 at p 377. 
27 Alice Bacon MP noted in a House of Commons debate on the Act that Hammond brought 
under scrutiny the long standing arrangements under, inter alia, the Petty Sessions 
(Ireland) Act 1851, House of Commons Hansard, vol. 707, 24 Feb. 1965 at col 540, cited 
at https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1965-02-24/debates/fb821017-1aac-4358-
abf2-2a0c584bc2e5/BackingOfWarrants(RepublicOfIreland)BillLords <accessed 30-08-
20>. A ‘stop-gap’ measure was introduced to temporarily address the situation in the UK 
by way of the Republic of Ireland (Consequential Adaptation of Enactment Order) 1964. 
28 At col 541-542. 
29 See for a discussion C. Campbell, ‘Extradition to Northern Ireland: Prospects and 
Problems’ (1989) 52(5) Modern Law Review 585 at p 590. 
30 O’Higgins Supra note 7 at p 891. 
 
Significantly, however, both the UK and Irish legislation contained a form of the 
political offence exception. Section 2(2) of the Backing of Warrants Act 1965 inter 
alia provided that an order should not be made if it was shown to the satisfaction 
of the court that the offence specified in the warrant is an offence of a political 
character or that there are substantial grounds for believing that the person will 
be prosecuted for an offence of a political character. The Extradition Act 1965 in 
ss 44 and 50 inter alia provided that extradition may be barred for ‘… a political 
offence or an offence connected with a political offence or [where] there are 
substantial reasons for believing that the person named or described in the 
warrant will, if removed from the state… be prosecuted or detained for a political 
offence or an offence connected with a political offence.’ The two conceptions 
accordingly differed, with Ireland adopting the version found in article 2 of the ECE 
– which is wider and more inclusive than the version applicable in the UK. Further 
novel safeguards in both statutes included provision that to be subject to the 
process an offence must be imprisonable for at least six months imprisonment and 
found in both jurisdictions – in other words double criminality was introduced.31 A 
right to apply to have the order set aside was also included. Under the Extradition 
Act 1965 a Minister was given the power to release the requested person on the 
basis of the offence being a political offence or connected with one, amongst other 
specified grounds under s 50(1)(4). There was no general discretion. The UK 
legislation gave no power to the Secretary of State to play a role in the process. 
The system of extradition between Ireland and the UK following the 1965 Acts, 
therefore, was a hybrid which incorporated aspects of orthodox international 
extradition agreements and the previously applicable backing of warrants system 
which eschewed all such features. 
 
Of all the new features of the Ireland–UK extradition relationship after 1965  the 
political offence exception was the most notable and controversial. Whilst the 
exception was also introduced into the law governing extradition the UK and 
 
31 Double criminality required the offences in the requesting and requested territories to 
correspond. In R v Governor of Belmarsh Prison, ex p Gilligan (No 1) [1999] 3 WLR 1244 
(HL) the House of Lords held that the word ‘correspond’ was an ordinary word not used in 
any technical sense. The system of surrender was intended to be simple and expeditious, 
and the task of the magistrate was to simply apply ‘correspond’ on the basis of the perusal 
of the warrants.  
 
Commonwealth states the political situation was very different.32 As is well known 
conflict over the constitutional status of Northern Ireland began to erupt into 
sectarian violence in the late 1960s. The three-decade conflict between 
nationalists (primarily identifying as Irish or Roman Catholic) and unionists 
(primarily identifying as British or Protestant) had a significant impact upon 
extradition between the Ireland and Northern Ireland. The most pronounced and 
controversial effect of the exception was the refusal of extradition on that basis of 
individuals from Ireland to the UK. Indeed, the extradition of politically motivated 
offenders from the Republic to the UK was in the early 1990s ‘… by far the most 
politically contentious issue to have troubled the relationship between these two 
countries over the last 20 years or so.’33 This fact followed a series of cases 
beginning in the early 1970s where the Irish courts upheld the exception.34 
Amongst these well-known cases are Bourke v Attorney General35, The State 
(Magee) v O’Rourke36 and Finucane v McMahon.37 In the latter, the Irish Supreme 
Court upheld Finucane’s appeal against extradition to Northern Ireland on the 
basis of the political offence exception. A notable aspect of the exception in Irish 
law was the vacillating position taken to its interpretation. The Irish Supreme 
Court had been required to interpret its nature and limits on several occasions, 
and was not wholly consistent this task.38 In contrast, UK courts were generally 
more consistent, and interpreted the exception more restrictively. A House of 
 
32 Whilst the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 did not contain a political offence exception, it 
was introduced as between Commonwealth countries by the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967.  
33 G. Hogan, and H. Delany, ‘Anglo-Irish Extradition Viewed from an Irish Perspective’ 
(1993) Public Law 93 at p 93. 
34 Campbell, supra note 29 at p 591. In the period subsequent to the entry into force of 
the two 1965 Acts O’Higgins notes that there had been “a large number of cases of 
surrender”, supra note 7 at p 894. 
35 [1972] IR 36. Note that in these cases the offences occurred prior to 18 May 1989. That 
is the date the provisions giving force to the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism entered into force in both jurisdictions.  
36 [1971] IR 205. This case and that of Bourke v Attorney General were decided the same 
day by the Supreme Court. Subsequent to these cases the Sunningdale Conference in 
1973 set up a joint Irish-UK Law Enforcement Commission to look into extradition. It failed 
to reach agreement on the political offence exception, see A. McCall, Smith, and P. Magee, 
‘The Anglo-Irish Law Enforcement Report in Historical and Political Context’ [1975] 
Criminal Law Review 200. 
37 [1990] 1 IR 505. 
38 See B. Dickson, The Irish Supreme Court: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2019) at pp 151 et seq, and Hogan and Delany, supra 
note 33. 
 
Lords example where an argument based on the exception was refused being 
Keane v Governor of Brixton Prison.39 It is clear, then, that Ireland adopted both 
a wider legislative articulation of the exception and a more liberal interpretation 
of it than taken in the UK. This was a fact that gave rise to considerable disquiet.   
 
The disparity in approach to the political offence exception by Ireland and the UK 
was gradually lessened. This began with the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism 1977. Reflecting a change in sentiment across Europe 
to politically motivated violence this treaty was designed to counter the operation 
of the exception. Article 1 lists offences not to be regarded as political offences for 
the purposes of extradition. The UK ratified the Convention in July 1978, and 
subsequently enacted the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978. The Republic signed 
the Convention in 1986 and ratified it in May 1989. The approach taken in Ireland 
was subject to criticism on account of the legislation giving force to it failing to 
specify that certain offences, including murder, could not be regarded as political. 
Instead the Extradition (European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) 
Act 1987 created a judicial discretion on the point. It also failed to include the 
possession of firearms as an offence deemed not to be political and was unclear 
as to aspects of the use of explosives and automatic firearms.40 That noted, the 
political offence exception under s 50 of the Extradition Act 1965 was ‘considerably 
circumscribed’ by ss 3 and 4 of the implementing legislation.41  
 
A final development to be noted that affected extradition relations in the period 
leading up to Good Friday Agreement and subsequently the application of the EAW 
between Ireland and the UK was the increasing relevance of human rights in 
Ireland’s extradition jurisprudence. The origins of which are found in Finucane v 
McMahon, mentioned above. In the case it was held by the Irish Supreme Court 
that Finucane had demonstrated that there was a probable risk of ill-treatment in 
the Maze Prison if he was returned and therefore in order to protect his 
 
39 [1972] AC 204. See also R. Governor of Winson Green Prison, Birmingham, ex parte 
Littlejohn, [1975] 3 All E.R. 208. 
40 See Hogan and Delany, supra note 33 at p 103-104.  
41 Ibid at p 119. It is notable that whilst the approach in the UK was retrospective, that in 
Ireland was not. See on this point T.J. Duffy, ‘The Law v. the IRA: The Effect of Extradition 
between the United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland and the United States in Combatting the 
IRA’ (1991) 9(2) Dickson Journal of International Law 293 at p 311. 
 
constitutional rights he was released. This case can be seen to have spawned 
further litigation. The right to a fair trial, for example, was put forward in 
opposition to extradition successfully in McGee v O’Dea.42 The consideration of 
human rights led Irish courts to adopt an ‘interventionist’ approach, whereby an 
‘in-depth examination of the requesting State’s practices and procedures’ was 
undertaken.43 Ironically, this development counters the efforts to curtail the 
political offence exception – with the trust implicit in foregoing the exception being 
undermined through human rights scrutiny. It was the Good Friday Agreement 
and the European Arrest Warrant that ultimately acted to rekindle that trust.   
 
Part 2 – The Present, 1998 - 2020   
 Peace and Prosperity as the European Union expands 
Marking the start of the modern context of Ireland – UK co-operation is the Good 
Friday Agreement (GFA), signed on 10 April 1998. It signified the end of most of 
the violence of the Troubles. The agreement accepted that the people of Northern 
Ireland wished to remain part of the United Kingdom but that a section of the 
population in Northern Ireland and the majority of the people of the island of 
Ireland wished for a united Ireland. Irrespective of Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional status the right of the people of Northern Ireland to identify and be 
accepted as Irish or British, or both was enshrined. A new period of “North/South” 
cooperation began with the creation of new institutions designed to co-ordinate in 
twelve areas of mutual interest. Central to the Good Friday Agreement is the 
maintenance of the Common Travel Area.  Under the CTA, British and Irish citizens 
can move freely and reside in either jurisdiction and enjoy associated rights and 
privileges, including the right to work, study and vote in certain election, as well 
as to access social welfare benefits and health services. 
 
Pre-dating the GFA by a quarter-century was Ireland and the UK’s membership of 
the EU. Initially integration in the field of police and criminal justice matters was 
a challenge for the organisation as ‘jurisdiction, criminal trial and criminal 
 
42 (1994) 1 IR 500.  
43 M. O’Higgins, ‘Pink Underwear, the European arrest warrant and the Law of Extradition’ 
(2007) 12(3) Bar Review 91 at p 92. The origins of this approach under the ECHR is found 
in the well-known case of Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439. 
 
sentencing are seen as the last bastions of national state power.’44 Early attempts 
at cooperation can be traced back to the creation of the TREVI group in 1975, with 
the first significant step to close cooperation being the opening of the EU’s internal 
borders through the establishment of the Schengen Area. Whilst neither the UK 
nor Ireland participated in the open border aspects of the Schengen Protocol both 
requested participation in the police and judicial co-operation elements of the 
Schengen acquis.45 This decision from Ireland’s perspective was made so as not 
to affect the existence of the Common Travel Area.46 The then UK Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, had made it clear that there was no question of the UK giving up border 
controls.47 
 
Even with retained border controls Ireland and the UK were affected by the 
freedom of movement of persons. A concomitant of which was an increased risk 
of crime. A common effort was needed in response throughout the EU.48 Whilst 
the Maastricht Treaty 1992 established Justice and Home Affairs as one of the EU’s 
three pillars on an intergovernmental basis the Amsterdam Treaty 1997 created 
an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ), a collection of home affairs and 
justice policies designed to ensure security, rights and free movement within the 
European Union. Significantly it endorsed the principle of mutual trust, which 
would go on to become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
within the European Union.49 Amongst the significant strides made during this 
period in enhancing cooperation in criminal matters was the creation of the 
European Arrest Warrant, discussed presently. It was adopted in 2002. 
 
 
44 W. Schomburg, ‘Are we on the Road to a European Law-Enforcement Area? International 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters. What Place for Justice’ (2000) 8 Eur J Crime Crim L & 
Crim Just 51. 
45 The application was made in accordance with Article 4 of the protocol Integrating the 
Schengen acquis into the Framework of the EU, which is annexed to both the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
46 Select Committee on European Scrutiny, Irish Application To Take Part in Elements of 
the Schengen Acquis, 24th report available at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmeuleg/23-xxiv/2308.htm 
<accessed 30-08-20>   
47 Independent, 28 March 2000. 
48 Editorial Comments (June 1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 1119 at 1120 
49 C. McCartney, 'Opting in and Opting Out: Doing the Hokey Cokey with EU Policing 
and Judicial Cooperation' (2013) 77 J Crim L 543. 
 
The final piece to the modern contextual puzzle to be noted is the step change in 
EU criminal justice cooperation in 2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon abolished the 
pillar structure and created Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union which regulated the AFSJ. Importantly, the Court of Justice (CJEU) now had 
jurisdiction over the area, the Commission gained enforcement powers and the 
European Council changed to majority voting for police justice and criminal 
cooperation matters. Most of the new controls came into force on 01 December 
2014 following the end of a 5-year transitional period.  The UK and Ireland were 
hesitant to embrace such close cooperation in criminal matters, primarily because 
their adversarial justice systems differ significantly from civil law jurisdictions 
found in most other European countries. What is important from our present 
perspective is that both Ireland and the UK remained part of the European Arrest 
Warrant scheme, which is subject to the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Clearly the 
importance of the EAW was recognised in the opt-out and opt-in machinations 
that followed the Treaty of Lisbon. The UK had until the end of the transitional 
period to decide whether to continue to be bound by measures adopted before the 
Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. It chose to block opt-out of 133 policing and 
judicial cooperation measures but simultaneously opted back in to 35 (including 
the EAW) stating, ‘where we believe it is in the national interest to participate we 
have pursued a policy of seeking “co-operation not control”’.50 Both the UK and 
Ireland negotiated the ability to ‘opt in’ to new legislation on a case by case basis. 
 
The European Arrest Warrant 
 
The EAW is a simplified procedure which enables surrender decisions to be made 
by judicial authorities on the basis of mutual recognition. The impetus for 
finalisation of the EAW FD was the terrorist attacks in the US on 11th September 
2001  Its benefits have been well set out during the opt-in and out decision of 
201451 and throughout the Brexit debate.52 As demonstrated above, the strength 
 
50 Hansard, HC Deb, 15 July 2013, vol. 566 (36), col. 777 (Theresa May). 
51 McCartney supra note 49. 
52 Select Committee on the European Union, Home Affairs Sub-Committee, Brexit: future 
EU-UK security and police co-operation, 2 November 2016 at p 8, cited at 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/e
 
of those arguments are heightened in light of the political history and situation 
between Ireland and the UK. The benefits of the EAW include the inability of 
Member States to refuse surrender of their own nationals, limited grounds for 
refusal, the absence of a double criminality requirement and the removal of 
political involvement. These have led to a faster and cheaper system of extradition 
than was available under the 1957 European Convention on Extradition.53 Indeed, 
in most cases surrender will occur within 60 days of arrest or 10 days with the 
defendant’s consent. Both Ireland and the UK implemented the Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between 
Member States of 13 June 2002.54 
 
Statistics reveal that the EAW quickly became an essential tool in the area of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters with 185,575 arrest warrants issued and 
56,298 executed across the EU since 2005.55  The UK has been an active user of 
the scheme and from 2009 to 2019, the UK issued a total of 2,678 requests to 
other member states, securing the return of 1,625 individuals out of 1,894 
arrested.56 In the same time period, a total of 11,300 individuals were 
surrendered from the UK pursuant to EAWs. Ireland has surrendered 247 
individuals to the UK since 2009, with 34 surrendered in 2019. The UK has 
surrendered 537 individuals to Ireland in the same time period including 58 
people in 2019. Whilst the numbers surrendered to the UK from Ireland are 
only a small proportion of those requested by the UK, the UK ‘remains the state 
 
u-home-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-future-ukeu-security-and-policing-
cooperation/oral/42904.pdf <accessed 29-08-20>. 
53 Home Affairs Select Committee, UK-EU security cooperation after Brexit, 4th report, HC 
635, 21 March 2018, cited at 
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<accessed 30-08-20>. 
54 Cited at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32002F0584 
<accessed 26-08-20>.  
55 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States COM/2020/270, at 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A270%3AFIN 
<accessed 26-08-20>.  
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capabilities-for-law-enforcement/fugitives-and-international-crime/european-arrest-
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with which Ireland has the greatest interaction’57 In 2017 60 out of 76 EAW 
requests transmitted by the Central Authority were from the UK.58 It was 
recognised by the Department of Justice that ‘in the context of combating crime 
and terrorism, the necessity to maintain a functioning system of extradition 
between the two States has been identified as a the key priority.’59 
  
There is no doubt that from the perspective of the UK and Ireland the EAW has 
transformed the scale of extradition.60 Non-EU extradition traffic is approximately 
one-tenth of EAW surrenders.61 Notable amongst these statistics is not just the 
number of surrenders, generally and between Ireland and the UK but also the 
volume of cases originating from Northern Ireland. In that regard from September 
2018 to August 2019 the Police Service for Northern Ireland issued 38 EAWs, 
twenty-six of which related to the Republic of Ireland and 12 to all other EU 
states.62 Conversely, the PSNI received 5 requests from the Republic of Ireland 
during that period, out of a total of 44 EAWs.63 Clearly the EAW plays a crucial 
role in Ireland-UK criminal co-operation today. Its relevance is perhaps even wider 
than that. It has been described as  
 
… the most emblematic and most widely implemented EU criminal law 
instrument. It aims to compensate for the freedom of movement enabled 
by the abolition of internal borders by ensuring that Member States’ justice 
systems can reach extraterritorially in order to bring individuals who have 
 
57 Report on the operation of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 for the year 2017, 
supra note 2, at p 4.  
58 However it should be noted that there was a notable increase in EAWs received by 
Ireland from the UK in 2017 as a result of the UK’s commencement of participation in the 
Schengen Information System and a consequential policy of sending non-participating 
States, such as Ireland, all warrants registered by the UK on the SIS II. 
59 Report on the operation of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 for the year 2017, 
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60 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, International Cooperation on Law 
Enforcement, 2 February 2018, cited at https://www.copfs.gov.uk/media-site/media-
releases/1687-international-cooperation-on-law-enforcement <accessed 30-08-20>.  
61 See Office of the DPP Annual Report 2017 at p 38, cited at 
https://www.dppireland.ie/app/uploads/2019/03/AR2017_eng.pdf.  
62 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-49576159 <accessed 29-08-
20>. 
63 Ibid. 
 
taken advantage of the abolition of borders to flee the jurisdiction to face 
justice.64  
 
An important point to note is that the UK leaving the EU does not alter the position 
of the movement of people between Ireland and the UK, the operation of the 
Common Travel Area continues. The arguments in favour of the EAW therefore 
subsist regardless of Brexit.  
 
The operation of the EAW has undoubtedly strengthened the mutual trust between 
Ireland and the UK. Previously, as discussed above, Irish jurisprudence had been 
favourable to the accused  and ‘had an illustrious history of being acutely conscious 
of potential human rights violations.’65 Ireland’s strict and sometimes sceptical 
attitude towards extradition during the 1980’s and 1990’s has been said to have 
arose from a mix of philosophical, psychological, legal and non-legal factors.66 
Again as noted, the period of the Troubles in Northern Ireland was particularly 
problematic. This reticence carried over to the  early days of the EAW, O’Higgins 
has argued, where the High Court continued to apply a Ellis v O’Dea67 type 
approach in an EAW context.68 Notwithstanding the cautious start, there is clear 
evidence that over the last 17 years the EAW has smoothed the extradition waters 
between Ireland and the UK as both re-embraced the principle of mutual trust and 
recognition. In the 2005 case of Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. 
Altaravicius, the Chief Justice, whilst accepting that the courts were not prevented 
from examining cases to ensure personal rights were guaranteed, stated they 
must ‘do so with a benefit of a presumption that the issuing State complies with 
its obligations.’ 69  In Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v McArdle the 
 
64 V. Mitsilegas, ‘European Criminal Law After Brexit’ (2017) 28 Criminal Law Forum 219 
at p 230. 
65 E. Fahey, ‘How to be a third pillar guardian of fundamental rights? The Irish Supreme 
Court and the European arrest warrant’ (2008) 33 EL Rev 563. 
66 O’Higgins, supra note 43 at p 91. 
67 (1989) IR 530. 
68 As demonstrated in the case of Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Stapleton 
where Peart J refused extradition on the basis of delay stating the Extradition Act 2003 
mandates “that this court shall not order the surrender of a requested person if to do so 
would not be compatible with this State’s obligations under the Convention or its protocols, 
or would constitute a breach of any provision of the Constitution.” Unreported, High Court 
(Peart J.) 21st February 2006. 
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respondent opposed surrender to the UK on a number of grounds including abuse 
of process.70 The Supreme Court dismissed those concerns ‘taking the view that 
they were all matters that were relevant only to the criminal trial and the weight 
to be attached to evidence tendered at the trial.’71 It should be noted, however, 
that whilst the principle of mutual trust underpinning the EAW enjoyed almost 
unfettered application during the first 10 years of application in recent years the 
pendulum has swung back toward an approach emphasising human rights.72 To-
date, this appears to be limited in the jurisprudence of both the UK and Ireland to 
cases concerning requests from eastern European states.73 
 
 
The success of the EAW has not been without concerns on either side of the Irish 
sea. Criticisms have been made in relation to its disproportionate use, 
unsatisfactory standards, length of pre-trial detention and access to a fair trial. 
One result of which has been the agreement by the European Commission that a 
proportionality requirement was necessary to prevent warrants from being issued 
for offences which are not serious enough. Judicial authorities should use the 
European Arrest Warrant system only when a surrender request is proportionate 
in all the circumstances of the case. The Commission’s Handbook on How to Issue 
and Execute a European Arrest Warrant states that the issuing judicial authorities 
should consider proportionality by weighing the usefulness of issuing a EAW in the 
specific case, with a list of suggested factors to be taken into account.74 The EU 
has also embarked on a programme to strengthen procedural rights although the 
UK largely chose not to participate. 
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Brexit and the Northern Ireland problem 
 
There is no doubt that the UK and Ireland have become so much closer and more 
intertwined as a result of common membership of the EU, particularly in the area 
of criminal justice cooperation. Hayward has demonstrated that membership of 
the EU was important for the Good Friday Agreement  
 
because it created the context within which such cross-border cooperation 
was normalised and depoliticised. The fact that nationalists felt themselves 
equal and protected as Irish citizens in Northern Ireland has been in no 
small part connected to the broader framework of common EU citizenship.75 
 
Accordingly, Brexit poses unique and challenging issues relating to Northern 
Ireland. This was recognised early on in the Brexit process where it was made 
clear by both the EU and the UK that their aim was ‘to ensure that the Common 
Travel Area and Good Friday Agreement (of which the UK has a special 
responsibility as co-guarantor) are not affected by the UK’s decision to leave the 
Union.’76 Michel Barnier, the Chief Brexit Negotiator framed ‘Ireland’s concerns’ as 
the ‘Union’s concerns’ and by doing so ‘effectively positioned the EU as a defender 
and guarantor of the Agreement, even as it was conducting negotiations with the 
UK.’77 Just as the process of European integration was one of the catalysts for the 
depoliticization of Irish/Northern Irish cross-border cooperation the UK’s 
departure from the EU removes this context and reintroduces a political dimension 
to cooperation. The Irish border still holds the potential for conflict. Northern 
Ireland, for all of its progress, is still a divided society and any action which draws 
attention to the border fuels tension.78 
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Adding further complexity to the position of Northern Ireland is the devolution of 
criminal justice. Since 2010 policing and justice have fallen under the remit of the 
NI Department of Justice and the Justice Statutory Committee of the NI Assembly. 
For its part the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) have repeatedly stressed 
that continued cross-border cooperation is key to combating organised crime and 
a resurgence of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland.79 The Joint Ministerial 
Committee (EU negotiations) was established to facilitate engagement between 
the UK Government and devolved administrations but for much of the negotiations 
Northern Ireland had no functioning Executive and therefore no representation on 
the Committee.80 Hayward, Phinnemore and Komarova argue ‘what the UK 
negotiates with the EU about criminal justice co-operation will uniquely impact 
Northern Ireland given the nature and challenges of cross-border cooperation on 
the island of Ireland’ and recommend that the remit of the British-Irish Council 
could be expanded to include areas previously coordinated at EU level such as 
criminal justice cooperation.81 The difficulties that the PSNI and An Garda Síochána 
will face if no replacement for the EAW is found have been recognised. To date, 
however, no solution has been proposed.82  
Part 3 – The Future 
The EAW Not an Option 
 
The first point to make in discussing the future extradition relationship between 
Ireland and the UK is that the EAW is not an option. At the beginning of the Brexit 
process the UK repeatedly stated that it wished to continue a close relationship 
with the EU in the field of criminal justice and this included access to the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW).83  Full participation in the EAW was always going to be 
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problematic, however, as it is linked to the free movement of people and based 
on the concept of mutual trust between Member States. Michel Barnier set out the 
underpinnings of mutual trust as being, ‘shared respect for fundamental rights as 
set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights; by certainty that other Member 
States enforce and apply the rules the same way, under the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice; and by the concept of EU citizenship, which allows 
Member States to lift the constitutional ban on the extradition of their own 
nationals.’84 The UK consistently has stated that Brexit meant the end of free 
movement of people, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. These red lines inevitably meant 
that the UK could not take part in the European Arrest Warrant. In March 2020 
the UK acknowledged that participation of the European Arrest Warrant is not 
possible stating that they were now seeking a ‘fast-track extradition 
arrangements, based on the EU’s Surrender Agreement with Norway and Iceland 
… but with appropriate further safeguards for individuals beyond those in the 
European Arrest Warrant.’85  
 
An EU-UK Multilateral Treaty on the horizon? 
The preferable replacement to the EAW is an EU-UK multilateral treaty. This is 
simply because under such an arrangement the UK’s extradition relations would 
be the same with all its former partners. In response to the UK’s statement in 
March 2020 the EU published a draft agreement as the starting point for 
negotiations.86 Surrender is set out in Chapter Seven.87 The initial proposal closely 
mirrors the Norway-Iceland agreement, which in turn is very similar to the EAW. 
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The minimum thresholds are identical88 as are the mandatory grounds for refusal 
of a warrant89; namely amnesty, double jeopardy and insufficient age of suspect.  
The optional grounds for refusal are again identical to those found in Article 4 of 
the EAW90 and the same territorial requirements are included.91 Execution may 
not be refused on the ground that the offence may be regarded as a political 
offence,92 although the UK and EU Member States would be able to make a 
declaration that this only applied to certain terrorism offences.93 In contrast to 
this largely common ground are several areas of contention.  
The position of nationals vis-a’-vis extradition is, of course, an issue with pedigree. 
The proposal provides that extradition would not be refused on the grounds that 
the person claimed is a national of the executing state. However, the UK and the 
EU on behalf of its Member States may make declaration that one’s nationals will 
not be extradited. The other party would then be entitled to reciprocity. This allows 
those countries having constitutional bars on extradition of their own nationals to 
third countries outside of the EU, such as Germany and Latvia, to make such a 
declaration. Ireland does not have a constitutional bar on extraditing its citizens if 
 
88 An arrest warrant may only be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing state 
by a custodial sentence or detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months 
or, if the sentence has been passed or detention ordered, for a sentence of at least four 
months. 
89 As found in Article 3 of the EAW. 
90Article LAW.SURR.80 1a) non-refusal due to tax differences b) prosecution in the 
executing state, c) a judicial decision has been made not to prosecute or proceedings 
halted, d) prosecution in statute-barred e) a final judgment on the same facts in a third 
state and the sentence has been served, f) the Member State undertakes to execute the 
sentence of a national or resident, g) offence committed in whole or part in the territory 
of the executing State or was committed outside of the territory of the issuing State and 
the law of the executing State does not allow prosecution for the same office committed 
outside of its territory, h) request based on conviction at trial where the D was absent 
without their knowledge and no right of re-trial. 
91 Under both agreements a state will be permitted to refuse to enforce a warrant in 
circumstances where the offence in respect of which it is issued is regarded by the law of 
that state as having been committed in whole or in part within its territory, or where such 
offence is committed outside the territory of the State issuing the warrant and the law of 
the executing state does not allow prosecutions for the same offences when committed 
outside its territory. 
92 See Article Law.SURR.81: Political offence exception. 
93 I.e. the offences referred to in Article 1 and 2 of the Council of Europe Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorism 1977, or Articles 1 to 4 of the Council Framework Decision 
on combating terrorism. 
 
an international agreement is in place providing for extradition. A similar provision 
on extradition of nationals exists under the Iceland-Norway agreement, and a 
number of Member States have chosen to make a declaration, under article 7(2), 
that they will not surrender their nationals, or will do so only under certain 
conditions.94 This demonstrates the extent to which the surrender of nationals was 
dependent on the principle of mutual trust and recognition. It seems reasonable 
to suppose that similar derogations would be made in relation to any UK-EU 
agreement. The UK will therefore lose the ability to extradite citizens from up to 
8 countries in some circumstances and 16 if it isn’t willing to return convicted 
nationals for the purpose of serving their sentence, a decision which would 
ultimately be in the hands of the courts, not politicians.  
The relevance of nationality does not stop at the extradition, or not, of a state’s 
own citizens. Recent CJEU case law has extended a degree of protection to citizens 
of the Union as such. In the 2016 case of Criminal proceedings against 
Petruhhin95 Latvia was prevented from extraditing an Estonian citizen to Russia 
under a bilateral agreement. It was successfully argued that this could be 
‘contrary to the essence of the citizenship of the Union, that is to say, the right of 
the Union citizens to protection equivalent to that of a Member State’s own 
nationals.’96 The case of Proceedings Related to  Raugevicius97  extended the 
‘Petruhhin principle’ to extradition for the purpose of enforcing a sentence, not 
just accusation warrants.98 In the case of Pisciotti v Germany99 the CJEU 
reaffirmed that Article 18 TFEU, the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds 
 
94 Germany, the Czech Republic, France, Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia have chosen not 
to extradite their nationals. Poland will not allow extradition of a national under the 
agreement unless the offence was committed outside of its territory. Portugal will only 
extradite its own citizens in cases of terrorism or organised international crime.  Greece, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, The Netherlands, Romania, Iceland, Norway and Croatia require 
any extradited citizen to be returned to serve their sentence. Available at https://www.ejn-
crimjust.europa.eu/ejnupload/News/Notifications_March_NO_Is.EN20.pdf <accessed 
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99 [2018) 3 CMLR 19. 
 
of nationality, applied to extradition to third countries. The effect of this 
jurisprudence is that Member States are obliged to inform the country of 
nationality of the Union citizen when applying a third party extradition agreement 
and to give priority to a possible EAW, provided that state has jurisdiction and 
wants to prosecute the same offence. When the UK becomes a ‘third country’ for 
the purposes of extradition with EU countries after 31 December 2020 its requests 
for extradition will be secondary to any request from the country of nationality for 
all EU citizens. If the UK requests extradition of a Polish citizen from Ireland, for 
example, Ireland will first contact Poland to make them aware of the request and 
will give precedence to a Polish EAW request. Also brought to the fore here is the 
fact that the UK’s leaving of the EU does not affect the jurisdiction of the CJEU in 
relation to remaining Member States when they apply any extradition agreement 
with the UK, whether it is a EU level agreement or not. 
The rights of the requested person under article 11 of the EAW have been 
expanded to expressly include an array of further defence rights.100 The UK 
published its response publicly in May 2020 and does not seek to include these 
further entitlements.101 . In contrast to the EAW but aligned to the Iceland-Norway 
agreement the EU proposal states that dual criminality is required as a condition 
for extradition except in defined circumstances. Importantly for Ireland and the 
UK this includes defined terrorism cases.102 The Norway-Iceland agreement 
provides that the requirement may be waived, however. To date only Spain, 
Slovenia, Lithuania and Romania and, with a more limited scope, Poland have 
waived double criminality as set out in Article 3(4).  
 
100 See Article Law.Surr.89: Rights of a requested person. 
101 Draft working text for an agreement on law enforcement and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters 
102 The UK on the one hand, or the EU on behalf of any Member State on the other, may 
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offence is an offence listed in Article 78(4) and carries a penalty in the State requesting 
extradition of at least three years’ imprisonment. The list of offences in Article 78(4) is the 
same as that set out in Article 2(2) of the EAW and Article 3(4) of the Norway-Iceland 
agreement and accordingly includes terrorism, drug trafficking, sexual exploitation of 
children, fraud, money-laundering, environmental crime, counterfeiting and piracy of 
products, rape, arson, and crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. It also includes broad 
concepts as “computer related crime”, “racism and xenophobia”, “swindling” (as opposed 
to “fraud”), “racketeering and “extortion” and “sabotage”. 
 
 The UK and the EU are on a collision course in relation to dispute resolution and 
if an agreement is to be reached one party will have to alter their position. In the 
Norway-Iceland agreement Article 36 provides that disputes are to be referred to 
a ‘meeting of representatives of the governments of the Member States of the 
European Union and of Iceland and Norway, with a view to its settlement within 
six months’.  Article 37 also provides that Norway and Iceland ‘shall keep under 
constant review the development of the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities’ relating to the Norway-Iceland agreement as well as to 
those of similar surrender instruments, such as the EAW. The EU is proposing a 
single future relationship with the UK which is overseen by two layers of 
institutions: a Partnership Council and specialised committees dedicated to distinct 
parts of the agreement. Disagreements would be dealt with by the Partnership 
Council at the first stage with the possibility of arbitration in the second stage. 
However, if a dispute raises a question of interpretation of EU law, the question 
will be referred to the CJEU for a ruling. This ruling will be binding on the 
arbitration tribunal.103 The UK wants no role for the CJEU and has instead proposed 
that a Joint Committee is responsible for the implementation and application of 
the agreement.104 The UK recognises that the agreement would be terminated or 
suspended if dispute settlement fails.  
A proportionality test for incoming requests is sought by the UK.105 The insertion 
of section 21A to the Extradition Act 2003 brought such a test, and a human rights 
bar, into UK law for EAW requests. This followed disquiet over the large number 
of extradition requests for minor offences, which frequently made the headlines in 
British papers and resulted in public criticism from organisations such as Fair Trials 
International as well as academics.106 Indeed, some requested persons faced 
lengthy extradition proceedings for offences such as ‘cycling whilst drunk’107 and 
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‘theft of a chicken.’108 Although it was possible to raise arguments akin to 
proportionality under Article 8 of the ECHR the amendment provided for a two-
stage proportionality test in the UK.109 The EU has taken the view that 
proportionality is a matter for the issuing state and not the executing state and 
proportionality as a principle is mentioned in the Handbook but not enshrined in 
the Framework Decision itself.110 The UK has proposed that ‘the United Kingdom 
and the Member States may require or permit the executing judicial authority to 
refuse to execute the arrest warrant on the basis that the surrender would be 
disproportionate’. This would take into account the seriousness of the offence, 
likely penalty and the possibility of taking measures less coercive than 
surrender.111 Bonasera argues that the insertion of a proportionality test, in that 
it acts to protect requested persons, is a necessary mechanism for ensuring the 
human and financial cost do not outweigh the benefits of surrender in any future 
agreement.112 Relevant here is the fact that the current recommendations in the 
EAW Handbook will no longer be applicable under the new arrangement (although 
a new handbook can be produced) and the list of ‘less coercive instruments of 
mutual legal assistance’, such as mutual recognition of financial penalties, may 
not be available between the UK and EU member states.113 This lends weight to 
the inclusion of a proportionality test in any final agreement. Related in a sense 
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to a proportionality test in that it acts to protect requested persons is the 
amendment to the EA 2003 that barred surrender on the grounds that a 
prosecuting decision had not been made. This was designed to protect individuals 
from lengthy periods of custody after surrender. The UK proposals includes a trial 
readiness provision.114 
  
It is agreement on the substantive issues, of course, which is central to the 
conclusion of a multilateral agreement between the EU and the UK. Also of note, 
though, is the time it may take to come to an agreement if one is reached and the 
time taken to approve an agreement. As just discussed, the EU’s proposed text 
meets a number of the UK’s requirements. Accordingly relatively little amendment 
to the Extradition Act 2003 would be required. The UK is placed to benefit from 
the years of work Norway, Iceland and the EU put in to negotiating that 
agreement. The outstanding issues noted above, however, may provide 
considerable challenges. It should certainly not be presumed that the eventual 
agreement can be readily agreed and brought into force. From the EU’s 
perspective the signing of such an international agreement is governed by Article 
218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Council 
is required to obtain the consent of the European Parliament before adopting a 
Decision to conclude an international agreement. European Parliament ratification 
and the agreement and completion of formalities in all Member States is also 
required. This latter point led to the delay in the entry into force of the Iceland-
Norway agreement. It should also be recalled that Norway and Iceland, although 
not EU Member States, are part of the Schengen Area. Membership of Schengen 
anticipates police and judicial co-operation, to compensate for the effect of the 
loss of border control on potential cross-border crime. Whilst the decision was 
made not to link the EAW to Schengen, the Council believed that it would be useful 
to apply the surrender procedure model to the Schengen countries given their 
privileged partnership with the EU Member States. The UK, of course, is not part 
of the Schengen Area. Whilst there may be willingness on the part of the EU 
negotiation team, agreement needs to be reached with each Member State and 
all need to implement the agreement, and decide which derogations to make, 
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before it will come in to force. Considering this took 12 years to happen with the 
Norway-Iceland agreement this is very unlikely to happen by the end of 2020.   
 
Alternative models of cooperation 
- European Convention on Extradition 1957 – the default 
option 
If an agreement between the EU and UK is not concluded and ratified by 31 
December 2020 the UK and Ireland will have to fall back on the 1957 European 
Convention on Extradition, in the medium term at least. This is clearly a second-
best option. Indeed, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee has noted 
that being forced to fall back on it would be a ‘catastrophic outcome’.115 There are 
a number of reasons for this. The Convention operates through diplomatic 
channels and therefore extradition would require political approval in the 
extraditing country. There are no strict time limits as there are with the EAW and 
it does not require states to extradite their own citizens.116 The UK, therefore, 
would lose the ability to extradite nationals of a significant number of countries. 
Further, there will be no agreed exceptions to the dual criminality requirement. 
The act underlying the extradition request would need to be an offence in both 
the requesting and executing state. Whilst States may be willing to be flexible 
it is likely that the courts will deal frequently with dual criminality arguments. 
Practitioners have argued that this could result in delay and an increase in the 
number of appeals to the higher courts.117 Conversely there are some 
safeguards in part 1 of the EA 2003 which will no longer be available such as 
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the absence of a prosecutorial decision in the requesting country, issues 
relating to speciality and importantly, the proportionality bar. An important 
point affecting the efficiency of the extradition process is the loss of the 
Schengen Information System II. Whilst distinct from the EAW, it operates 
alongside providing for real time warrants and alerts. Its loss means Interpol 
red notices relying on diplomatic channels will be relied upon. There is increased 
potential for missed opportunities to apprehend suspects. Most EU countries do 
not use Interpol, relying on the more effective SIS II. The UK could choose to 
give effect to red notices and will need to work diplomatically and practically 
with the EU 27 to try and amend usual practice to facilitate arrest in the UK. 
Overall, the 1957 Convention is now out of date and little used by most states. 
UK warrants may not be dealt with as a priority and UK prosecution authorities 
will have to rely on informal in-country relationships to a much greater extent.    
 
It appears clear that reliance on the 1957 Convention could see a slow grinding 
of cooperation, previously lubricated by membership of the EU. This could 
negatively impact the security of both countries. Whilst peace in Ireland can be 
traced to the Good Friday Agreement, this is fragile.118 If sectarian violence 
were to resurface a possibility is that requests for extradition under the 1957 
Convention of any individuals wanted on IRA related terrorism charges, could 
be refused on the basis of Article 3 of the 1957 Convention, which prohibits 
extradition for offences ‘regarded by the requested Party as a political offence 
or as an offence connected with a political offence.’ Of course both Ireland and 
the UK remain party to the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism 1977, which stands in the way of reliance on the exception. There is 
no doubt, however, EU membership and the Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant 2002 acted to build the trust to render the revival of 
the exception unthinkable. The proposed UK-EU agreement, in line with the 
Norway-Iceland agreement, bars refusal of cooperation on the grounds that the 
offence may be regarded by the executing state as a political offence, connected 
with a political offence or inspired by political motives.119 Whilst the proposed UK-
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EU agreement would protect the UK and Ireland from problems that could arise in 
relation to sectarian terrorism charges, the 1957 Convention per se does not. 
Categories: Blog, 
- The UK and Ireland’s preparation for operation of the 
1957 Convention 
Notwithstanding the manifest difficulties, falling back on the 1957 Convention 
is an outcome extradition practitioners have been preparing for both in the UK 
and Ireland for some time. From a practical perspective, in order to give effect 
to the Convention, the UK needs to designate all EU Member States as ’Category 
2’ territories for the purpose of the EA 2003. This will bring them within the 
remit of Part 2 of the EA 2003 containing the provisions for the UK’s extradition 
arrangements with countries with which it has a bilateral or multilateral treaty 
obligation. A sub-category of these Category 2 countries are those designated 
by the Home Secretary as exempt from the requirement to demonstrate a prima 
facie case against a requested person. Council of Europe countries who are not 
Member States (as well as Israel, Republic of Korea and South Africa) but who 
are signatories to the ECE 1957 are currently designated as not having to 
demonstrate a prima facie case. Article 62 of the Withdrawal Agreement 
provides that EAWs executed before the end of the transition period continue 
to operate under the Framework Decision. The effect of this would mean that 
provisional arrest warrants will not be required if a EAW has been executed 
before 31 December 2020. However the role of the CJEU in cases executed in 
the UK before 31 December 2020 but not yet concluded is unclear. 
The UK has made certain legislative preparations for the event of a no-deal in 
relation to extradition and the application of the 1957 Convention.  
Amendments to the Extradition Act 2003 proposed in the Extradition 
(Provisional Arrest) (HL) Bill 2019120 will create a power of arrest, without 
warrant, for the purpose of extraditing people for serious offences if a certificate 
has been issued by the designated authority and the extradition request comes 
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from a ‘designated category 2 territory’.121 The amendment has been made 
because the power already exists under part 1 of the Act and this is preparatory 
to re-designating all EU countries as category 2 territories as requested by the 
police as part of its contingency planning for no deal. The Law Enforcement and 
Security (Amendment)(EU Exit) Regulations 2019122 section 56 amends the 
Extradition Act 2003 (Designation of Part 2 Territories) Order 2003123 by adding 
to the list the 27 EU states, including, of course, Ireland. The Explanatory Notes 
to the Regulations provide that they ‘… ensure that the UK has the correct legal 
underpinning to operate the ‘no deal’ contingency arrangement (the 1957 Council 
of Europe Convention on Extradition) that would be used in lieu of the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW)’.124 The sole remaining Part 1 territory is Gibraltar, by 
section 55. 
Ireland has also been making legislative preparations for a no deal scenario. 
The Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Consequential 
Provisions) Act s 93 amended section 14 of the Extradition Act 1965 to provide:  
 
Extradition shall not be granted where a person claimed is a citizen of 
Ireland, unless — (a) the relevant extradition provisions or this Act 
otherwise provide, or (b) the law of the requesting country does not prohibit 
the surrender by the requesting country of a citizen of that country to the 
State for prosecution or punishment for an offence.  
 
This was necessary because s 14 of the Extradition Act 1965 as amended provided 
that a citizen could only be extradited to Britain if the relevant extradition 
provisions provided such – whilst the EAW did, the ECE does not.125 Without this 
amendment Ireland would not have been able to extradite its own nationals to the 
UK under the 1957 Convention. 
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- The Future Operation of the 1957 Convention 
Whilst both countries are legislatively prepared to fall back on the 1957 
Convention the problems attendant to a slow, costly, ineffective system would 
almost certainly impact extradition between the UK and Ireland.  Briscoe, says of 
the difference between the ECE and the EAW; 
it would be necessary in all cases to prove correspondence of offences 
between Ireland and Britain. Given the historical links, it is not anticipated 
that this would present a substantial issue. There would undoubtedly be 
delays encountered in using the convention as the basis of extradition, as 
it has more ‘moving parts’ – with, for example, the diplomatic transmission 
of extradition documents being a requirement.126  
Mitigating the difficulties somewhat would be the close historical ties, shared 
language and similarities in legal systems, particularly their adversarial nature. In 
addition, police and prosecutors have traditionally had a close working relationship 
which underpins cooperation across the island of Ireland. The Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Co-operation on Criminal Justice Matters and the Joint Cross-border 
Policing Strategy are just two such examples, both predating EU membership and 
sitting outside of the EU framework. Mutual trust and recognition between the UK 
and Ireland is easier to achieve than between the UK and states with different 
legal traditions. As noted, UK and Ireland are close working partners for the 
purpose of extradition, and a simple and easy method of extradition is vital to the 
safe operation of the Common Travel Area. The need for legal and operational 
cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will not 
disappear but, as noted by Fletcher and Macano, ‘the unifying forces which flow 
directly from commitment to comply with the EU’s legal framework will. It remains 
to be seen what impact, if any, this will have on the future of internal cooperation 
in this field.’127 
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What does appear inevitable are challenges to aspects of the system of extradition 
governing Ireland-UK relations subsequent to the EAW. Indeed, this has already 
started. The case of Minister for Justice and Equality v O’Connor highlights the 
simple fact that uncertainty and change bring litigation.128 The appeal highlights 
potential for legal challenges where post-Brexit arrangements or cooperation is 
too piecemeal to the point that it undermines the mutual trust and recognition. 
The patchwork of EU instruments in this area cannot be easily disaggregated as 
many mechanisms support or underpin each other, as seen with the SIS II 
mentioned above. The efficacy of a particular measure often depends upon the 
availability of a range of further cooperation mechanisms. The EAW process is 
assisted, for example, by cooperation measures that ensure extradited individuals 
are treated fairly after conviction including the European Prisoner Transfer 
agreement which enables individuals to serve custodial sentences in their home 
country. Further, it is difficult to say how the courts will deal with the delay 
inevitably caused by the departure of the UK from the EAW. Individuals being 
processed at the point the UK formally leaves the EAW may well be released from 
custody. If an arrest warrant has been issued but the wanted person has not yet 
been arrested new proceedings would have to be started.  
 
Whilst the UK and Ireland have prepared for reliance on the 1957 Convention, it 
is not sustainable in the long term. The clear preference of both the UK and Ireland 
is for an EU wide agreement. As Mitsilegas has argued a UK-EU agreement is ‘the 
most desirable in terms of ensuring legal certainty, the establishment of an EU-
wide level-playing field for the UK, and operational efficiency to the extent that 
they have the potential to maintain the United Kingdom’s position as close as 
possible to its current position as an EU member state.’129 If such an agreement 
cannot be reached by 31 December 2020 it is argued that the UK and Ireland 
should be permitted to enter into a bilateral arrangement on extradition.  
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- Is a bilateral agreement between the UK and Ireland a 
possibility? 
The difficulties facing the conclusion of an EU-UK agreement and the deficiencies 
of the fall-back reliance on the 1957 Convention have been discussed. An option 
that might form a bridge between the EAW and a multilateral agreement and 
mitigate the failings of the 1957 Convention is a bilateral extradition treaty 
between Ireland and the UK. There is clear precedent for Member States entering 
into extradition arrangements with third countries outside of an EU wide 
agreement. Member States retain competence with respect to entering and 
performing such agreements, until such time as the EU has concluded a 
corresponding agreement. Whilst extradition within the EU is of course governed 
by the EAW, extradition from EU Member States to third states is generally 
regulated by bilateral agreement. The EU per se has only concluded agreements 
with the USA and Norway and Iceland. It is also clear however, as Criminal 
Proceedings against Petruhhin130 shows, EU law does provide for certain 
restrictions on the way that Member States can exercise their competence in cases 
where provisions of EU law may be involved. In the case the CJEU has confirmed 
that EU law still applies to issues that fall within the competence of Member States, 
such as extradition under a bilateral agreement but that the court does not 
question the competence of Member States to enter into such agreements unless 
the EU has already exercised its competence.  Once an EU level agreement is 
reached there is precedent for the Commission enforcing exclusive competence. 
Infringement proceedings were launched against Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania for signing an agreement with 5 Western Balkan akin to the Prüm 
framework, governing the exchange of biometric data.131 The Commission 
considers the agreement is in breach of EU exclusive competence in the area, as 
the exchange of such data between Member States is covered by the Prüm Council 
Decisions. A reasoned opinion has yet to be given in the case. In the scenario 
suggested, the UK and Ireland would be seeking to enter into a bilateral 
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agreement whilst EU wide negotiations are ongoing but not complete, and the 
agreement would cease to apply once an EU wide agreement is ratified. Such a 
scenario is provided for in Article 4 of the Council Decision adopting the Withdrawal 
Agreement. This provides Ireland the opportunity to obtain permission to 
negotiate a bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom if it necessary for the 
proper functioning of the Northern Ireland protocol.132 Interestingly, however, 
even in this scenario it is possible for EU countries to continue to be bound by a 
bilateral agreement where it is subsequently superseded by an EU wide 
agreement. Finland and Sweden, for example, continue to apply the Nordic Arrest 
Warrant as a pre-existing agreement despite the EU concluding the EAW.  
- Nordic Arrest Warrant – a way forward for Ireland and the 
UK? 
For 50 years prior to the EAW the Nordic countries133 had a system of regional 
extradition. Historically this was not based on a multilateral treaty but based on 
direct cooperation regulated by national legislative processes, akin to the backing 
of warrants system between the UK and Ireland. A description from 1958 was in 
much the same terms: 
The Police in the country where the person in question is staying will, upon 
request from the police in another Nordic country, return the person to that 
country without particular formalities. Thus, the situation may now be said 
to be that, practically speaking, one does not go through extradition in 
relations between the Nordic countries but that, instead, one has put to use 
an informal procedure for return of such persons where the police alone 
handles the case.134 
There was no international duty to extradite, which meant it was national law 
which legalised “intra-Nordic extradition” subject to certain legal safeguards. In 
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practice extradition was always facilitated by each of the countries unless 
specifically prohibited by legislation. There was strict observance of the ‘aut 
dedere aut judicare’ principle and any refusal would be followed by proceedings in 
the requested state. There was no need for dual criminality to be established, 
relying instead on mutual recognition of substantive criminal law and no prima 
facie requirement. Summary or fast track extradition was provided for in cases of 
consent and direct communication between judicial authorities was encouraged. 
There were very low penalty thresholds, no bar on the extradition of nationals and 
no political offences exception within the intra-Nordic context.  None of the Nordic 
countries, although signatories, applied the European Convention on Extradition 
1957 inter se. Similar to the UK and Ireland the Nordic passport union of 1954 
provided for an area of free movement people and whilst formalisation of 
extradition was required to ensure legal certainty and protection it was thought 
the system had to be simple and effective.135 Intra-Nordic extradition was 
underpinned by mutual trust and historically strong cultural, legal and linguistic 
ties between the countries.136 It relied on flexibility and willingness to cooperate 
rather than on legal obligations. 
Interestingly, the intra-Nordic system based on the national law of the five 
countries has been overtaken by a convention. In 2005 the Nordic Arrest Warrant 
(NAW) was agreed, despite Norway and Iceland not being EU Member States. It 
was inspired by the EAW, which ironically was itself based upon the previous 
Nordic system.137 The NAW mirrors the substantive provisions of the Framework 
Decision and mutual recognition is made explicit. The notable differences are that 
there are lower minimum penalties, double criminality is abolished (there is no list 
at all) and there are no territoriality restrictions whilst there are limits on the 
speciality rule. Further, there is considerable shortening of the procedural time 
limits as compared even to the EAW. Overall the NAW is aimed at establishing ‘an 
even more efficient extradition procedure between close neighbours.’138  The point 
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that can be drawn here is that it appears wholly possible for Ireland and the UK 
to conclude a bilateral extradition agreement, and with terms that provide for even 
closer co-operation than the EAW. 
Conclusion 
There are lessons to be learnt from Ireland-UK extradition history. It has been 
seen that prior to the EAW the long-standing extradition relationship eschewed 
international practice and was governed by domestic legislation. The reciprocal 
acceptance of warrants remained at the heart of the system for many years 
although this practice was subsequently shaped by the European Convention on 
Extradition 1957 and later the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism 1977. Casting a shadow over the relationship between Britain and 
Ireland was the break down in extradition between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic between 1928 and 1965. The insertion of a political offence exception 
into the 1965 legislation resulted in a series of high-profile refusals to extradite 
which in turn exacerbated tensions. In spite of those tensions underlying 
extradition between the UK and Ireland throughout its history has been geographic 
proximity, the Common Travel Area and a shared legal heritage. 
Membership of the EU and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 have 
marked a period of peace of prosperity for the island. The UK and Ireland have 
become much closer and intertwined, particularly in the area of criminal justice 
cooperation. Largely as a result of membership of the EU cross-border cooperation 
was depoliticised. Thirty years after Ireland and the UK joined the EU the EAW 
came into force. It quickly became an essential tool for both Ireland and the UK, 
and in particular between Northern Ireland and the Republic. As such maintaining 
a functioning system of extradition is a key priority for both parties.   Whilst the 
UK and the EU accept that continued membership of the EAW is not possible 
for the UK, its replacement remains unclear. The preference of the UK and the 
EU is for an EU-wide agreement which, in the short term at least, offers greater 
legal certainly and operational efficiency. The reality is that such an agreement 
will not be in place before the end of transition. Too many contentious hurdles 
need to be overcome. The default position is that as of 31 December 2020 the 
UK will fall back on the European Convention of Extradition 1957. Both the UK 
 
and Ireland have prepared as well as they can for this. It is, however, not a 
long-term solution.  
The optimal solution for the UK and Ireland is a bilateral extradition 
arrangement. It could mirror the EAW, but with provision to improve upon it in 
light of the Ireland–UK setting. The justification of the EAW is that it compensates 
for freedom of movement. The existence of the Common Travel Area, in operation 
since the creation of the Irish Free State (albeit suspended during the height of 
the Troubles) is central amongst the reasons for the close extradition relationship 
between the two nations prior to the EAW. The UK leaving the EU does not alter 
the operation of the Common Travel Area. The arguments in favour of an EAW-
style system subsist in the Ireland-UK context regardless of Brexit. It is a truism 
that the closer any two countries are geographically, economically and politically 
the greater the need for cooperation. The UK and Ireland have no closer 
neighbour.  
EU Member States retain competence with respect to entering and performing 
bilateral extradition agreements with third countries until the EU has concluded 
such an agreement. If an EU wide agreement was reached Ireland and the UK 
could abandon the bilateral agreement although, as seen, there is precedence 
for continued operation of a bilateral agreement. Finland and Sweden continue 
to apply the Nordic Arrest Warrant despite the EU reaching a subsequent 
agreement with Norway and Iceland. The Nordic Arrest Warrant is a potential 
template for the UK and Ireland. The Nordic countries have many similarities 
akin to those between the UK and Ireland, a shared history, languages, legal 
traditions and the abandoning of borders long before Schengen. This led to 
close Nordic extradition cooperation long predating the EAW. If Ireland and the 
UK were successfully to conclude a bilateral agreement such an agreement 
would likely be very influential in any later EU-UK agreement. Indeed given the 
legal and linguistic connections between the two states it is hard to see a larger 
agreement being made without the former being successful.  
 
The principle of EU citizenship is at the heart of the EAW. When proposing the 
EAW the Commission argued for removal of the political offence exception 
stating that 
 
Since the European Arrest Warrant is based on the idea of citizenship of the 
Union …, the [political offence] exception provided for a country’s nationals, 
which existed under traditional extradition arrangements, should not apply 
within the Common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. A Citizen of the 
Union should face being prosecuted and sentenced wherever he or she has 
committed an offence within the territory of the European Union, 
irrespective of his or her nationality.139 
Whilst Brexit changes the status of UK citizens, who no longer enjoy EU citizenship, 
it importantly does not change the fundamental tenet of the Good Friday 
Agreement. Citizens of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are to be 
treated equally, they can choose Irish citizenship, British citizenship or both. They 
are free to choose where to live, work and study.  The shared history of the UK 
and Ireland, particularly in relation to their citizens living on the island of Ireland, 
lends strong justification to a continued close extradition relationship. The Nordic 
Arrest Warrant presents a blueprint for regionalised extradition cooperation which 
can run alongside the EAW. Features of the NAW, which in certain areas go beyond 
the provisions of the EAW, reflect the very high level of mutual trust between the 
Nordic countries. As noted above the mutual trust between all EU Member States 
has proved increasingly problematic in recent years, particularly after the 
expansion of the EU. In contrast, a level of mutual trust and even mutual 
recognition between Ireland and the UK is much easier to achieve. Whilst the EU 
continues to attempt to strengthen mutual trust, as it should, Mathisen argued 
that ‘the necessary mutual trust may presently exist between smaller groups of 
neighbouring countries.’140 This is exactly the case between Ireland and the UK. 
The NAW offers a lawful blueprint for a future which could see the UK and Ireland 
enjoy closer extradition arrangements than at present without harming or 
hindering the EAW.  
 
139 Recital 12 of the Preamble in the Commission Proposal. 
140 Mathisen, supra note 134. 
